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Abstract
This paper investigates within family the effects of parental income shocks
on individual’s dietary intake. Drawing on large-scale panel data from
the China Health and Nutrition Survey from 1991 to 2011, I examine the
macronutrient intakes of 2 to 17-year-old siblings of mixed-sex and their
parents in 3,244 families. Gender disparity in carbohydrate intakes ac-
counts for 15 percentage points in child sample, 30 percentage points in
adolescents, and 50 percentage points between parents using the Dietary
Reference Intakes standards. The paper further shows that when families
experience negative income shocks, food is allocated in the order of fathers,
sons, daughters and mothers. Gender inequality of intra-household resource
allocation is heightened in the event of large income losses.
“Food consumption in particular has been shown to serve as a symbol or a code, de-
scribing certain human relationships, such as inclusion and exclusion, and intimacy and
distance. Eating may also tell us about ourselves for eating is a rutted habituation that is
so close to the core of our memories, to the formation of our character and the launching
of our conscious experience, that its substances may be said to become a part of us.”
—Bernadine Chee, 2000
Introduction
This paper investigates the intra-household effects of negative income shocks on nu-
trition intakes of Chinese boys versus girls; mothers versus fathers; and children versus
parents. Specifically, when an income loss occurs, whose food intake decreases most?
China has a long history of privileging male children. Parents treat the food their
sons eat as a reflection of their improved economic status of the family, and no other
mode of parent-child interaction communicates their love for their sons more than food
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Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Carolina Pop-
ulation Center, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the NIH (R01-HD30880, DK056350, and
R01-HD38700) and the Fogarty International Center, NIH for financial support for the CHNS data col-
lection and analysis files from 1989 to 2006 and both parties plus the China-Japan Friendship Hospital,
Ministry of Health for support for CHNS 2009 and future surveys.
(Jing, 2000). Many families, especially in rural areas, still treat sons as their own family
members, while daughters will eventually be “married off”, and leave the families. There-
fore, it is common for parents to allocate income and resources from the daughter to son,
especially when under a negative income shock when resources become scarce. Further-
more, sons are expected to support the parents when parents enter old age, especially
in rural China. According to the China National Bureau of Statistics data in 2005, pen-
sions cover 4.6% of elderly support in the rural area, while family support accounts for
54.1%(Dorfman et al., 2013). The majority of the old-age support is from private re-
sources. Parents have the incentive to invest in sons, thus directly investing in their future
pension. Son-priority could also be explained by the gender imbalance and the high com-
petition faced by boys. The marriage rate of men in China is positively correlated with
socioeconomic status, and females are equally likely to get married regardless of the so-
cioeconomic status. Parents therefore are more likely to have higher expectations on their
sons’ performance and thus will allocate more food to their sons.
This paper fills three areas that are understudied in the literature. First, it is well-
established that economic stress causes obesity (e.g. Smith, 2009; Offer, Pechey, & Uli-
jaszek, 2010; Rohde, Tang, & Osberg, 2017; Watson, Osberg, & Phipps, 2016) but the
channel of the weight-gain is unclear. This paper examines the dietary changes under eco-
nomic stress, which contributes to the relationship between obesity and economic condi-
tions. Second, the existence of intra-household inequality is acknowledged as a problem in
all societies, but few studies have investigated it due to the scarcity of data on resource
allocation within households. This paper uses food intake, which is one of the most im-
portant kinds of resource in Chinese culture (Chee, 2000), to infer the inequality between
boys and girls, fathers and mothers, and parents and children. Third, the effects of eco-
nomic anxiety on health outcomes are mainly focused on adults, and little attention has
been paid to children (except for Kong & Phipps (2016)). I investigate the effects of neg-
ative income shock on not only adults but also on the children. The finding has strong
policy implications, as it suggests that families switch from the primary resource (protein)
to an inferior resource (carbohydrate), which could affect children’s development.
Novelties of this study include the following: 1) This paper provides the rare exam-
ination, if not the first, of full range of family dynamics in intra-household allocation of a
scarce resource. 2) It observes 32,44 groups of siblings of mixed-sex in the same families as
well as their parents in 12 provinces from 1991 to 2011 and followed them up to 5 times.
3) Son and daughter pairs within the households are compared to infer intra-household
resource allocation. 4) The daily intakes of macronutrients, summarized into protein, car-
bohydrates, fat and energy categories, are recorded respectively for both siblings and their
parents. The categories of nutrition intake shed light on not only the quantity but also
the quality of the resource allocation. 5) The level of daily intake is adjusted for age- and
gender-specific international standards.
The main purpose of the paper is to investigate the gender inequality within house-
holds using nutrition distribution. It enriches the literature that examines the changes
in nutrition intakes in response to a negative income shock within the household, as well
as documents the macronutrient intakes of Chinese children and their parents, especially
compared to international standards.
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Related literature
The study of inequality often neglects inequality among household members (Bur-
ton, Phipps, & Woolley, 2007). Equal sharing of income, consumption, resource and well-
being within the household is commonly assumed. However, a growing number of studies
point out the importance of intra-household allocation. For example, Phipps & Burton
(1995) discover that individual well-being is sensitive to income-sharing assumptions. Lise
& Seitz (2011) estimates that the Gini coefficient could increase by 30% after accounting
for consumption inequality within U.K. households.
Even if the existence of household inequality is recognized, the study of intra-
household inequality is largely restrained by the data availability as the income is usually
collected at household level (Osberg, 2000). Researchers have adopted different dimen-
sions such as time, consumption, health and satisfaction to estimate the inequality within
the household. For example, Burton, Phipps, & Woolley (2007) includes home produc-
tion in income inequality. Phipps, Burton, & Osberg (2001) demonstrate the inequality of
free time for self among dual-earner households, and women are more likely stressed about
weekly hours, despite the total hours of labour supply. Osberg (2015b) uses self-reported
food deprivation in Tanzania and finds the elderly rural women are more likely to suffer
from hunger. He highlights the gendered intra-household inequality and the demonstrates
the importance of including such inequality into poverty measurements and pension de-
signs.
Apart from inequality between spouses in the household, intra-household inequal-
ity also exists between parents and children, as well as sons and daughters. Lundberg,
Pollak, & Wales (1997) shows an increase in children’s clothing expenditure if the fam-
ily allowance is directly paid to mothers. (Burton, Phipps, & Woolley, 2007) uses the age
difference between couples in the eligibility of receiving the Old Age Security in Canada,
and the result suggests that the increase in women’s income leads to a larger expendi-
ture on gifts (possibly to grandchildren). Haddad & Hoddinott (1994) uses data from
Cote D’Ivoire and discover that an increase in women’s cash income leads to an increase
in boys’ height-for-age relative to girls’. (Duflo, 2000) uses the expansion of the Old Age
Pension program in South Africa and finds an improvement in girls’ health and nutrition.
To my knowledge, most research on intra-household inequality uses exogenous increases in
income to investigate the resource allocation. Few studies have been done using an income
fall.
I am particularly interested in food intake for three reasons. First, nutrition during
childhood has long-term effects on the development of cognitive skills and the productivity
later in life (e.g. Dasgupta, 1995). Such effects are particularly important in developing
countries (Duflo, 2000). Second, Chinese culture is highly food-oriented (Chang, 1977),
and food serves as a symbolic value of love. The process of deciding which foods to eat,
who will eat them, and how much to eat provides a path to understanding their everyday
lives, and draws a vital picture of their relationship with other people. The food allocation
shapes the family dynamics between parents and children, sons and daughters, reflecting
the pleasures and pressure of family members (Chang, 1977).
Third, people of different cultures, geographies, and ethnicities eat different food
and have different ways to prepare and cook food. For example, southern Chinese people
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tend to eat rice and favour sweet flavours, while northern Chinese cuisine features wheat
and a salty flavour. Western Chinese cuisine serves hot and spicy meat based dishes. The
differences in the food items, flavour, and cooking methods can all be measured in calo-
ries, carbohydrates, proteins, and fats. Such measures make them comparable resource in-
dicators across culture, ethnicity, and economic status and over time1. Despite the empha-
sis on food in Chinese culture, only a few studies have examined food intake in China. For
example, Jing (2000) adopts a sociology perspective and conducts case studies in munic-
ipalities such as Beijing and Xi’an to portray the changes in food intake under the rapid
socioeconomic development of China. Chang (1977) examines the evolution of food cul-
ture over the history of five thousand years. The only quantitative research has been done
focused on child food intake in contemporary China at a national level is Cui & Dibley
(2012). They present the trend of dietary intake of Chinese children aged 7 to 17 using
the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data. They show a steady decline in
energy and carbohydrate intake, and a steady increase in fat intake from 1991 to 2009.
The value of daily protein intake decreases, but the ratio of protein-energy ratio increases
slightly. However, Cui & Dibley mainly focus on the nutrition transition to a fat diet, and
do not examine the income changes, sibling disparity, and parent-child interactions.
Past literature has linked stress with changes in eating behaviour. Smith (2009), Of-
fer et al. (2010) and Köster & Mojet (2015), among other studies, describe food that is
high in fat and carbohydrates as comfort food, and is served as self-medication; providing
immediate relief from negative emotions. In other cases, Macht (2008), Köster & Mojet
(2015), and Staudigel (2016) discover that stress could also reduce appetite and food in-
take. The bi-directional effects of emotion show that stress controls, suppresses, impairs,
regulates, or harmonizes eating behaviour. On average, Macht (2008) shows that emo-
tional stress induces 30% people to increase while 48% people to decrease in food intake
using survey data. Staudigel (2016) uses Russian panel data and demonstrates economic
insecurity reduces women’s body weight. He also discovers a strong link between economic
insecurity and sugar consumption.
In the Chinese context, Liu et al. (2007) examines the relationship between types of
food consumed by college students in seven cities and their stress and depression mea-
sures. They find that the consumption of ready-to-go food (such as instant noodles,
frozen, canned or microwavable foods), snack foods (such as potato chips, corn chips and
tortilla chips) and fast food (such as McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut) is positively correlated
with perceived stress level depression scores. They do not establish the causal relationship
between stress and eating behaviour. No research thus far examines the intergenerational
dietary change resulted from economic stress. This paper is also the first study in Chinese
context to examine the dietary change of parents and children in response to an economic
shock.
1In the fixed effects estimation, I examine the changes in marcronutrient intakes are examined within
the same household. Energy, carbohydrate, protein, and fat intakes provide comparable measures of re-
source allocation.
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Data
The CHNS dietary intake data
The data of analysis are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from
1991 to 2011 (eight cycles). The CHNS is the only large-scale longitudinal data set (Pop-
kin et al., 2010) conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. It covers 12 provinces that vary in ge-
ography, demographics and socioeconomic development (China Health and Nutrition Sur-
vey , 2017). Figure 1 presents the provinces that are covered by the CHNS data. Within
each province, the sample is stratified by one low-, two middle- and one high- per-capita
income county or city. The township capital and three villages in the county or the urban
and suburban areas in the city are randomly selected. Twenty households are then ran-
domly selected for the survey. All household members are interviewed. Children younger
than 10 years old are assisted by parents. Community, household, and individual level
data are collected. The CHNS is representative of more than half of the population in
China. There are 12,944 households and 16,066 children in the 1991 cycle. In 2011, there
are 15,508 households and 22,977 children in the survey.
The CHNS hosts several features that make it particularly attractive for this study.
First, the longitudinal nature of the data enables me to observe families for up to 14 years
2 During the 14 years, the rapid economic development accompanied by the economic re-
forms takes place and creates a rare opportunity to study negative income shocks. In the
data 11.6% of the sample, which amounts to 646 children, experience large negative in-
come shocks (defined as 25% of income loss). Second, the CHNS not only provides in-
formation on the household heads, but also every household member, including fathers,
mothers, sons and daughters. The ability to identify the relationship of household mem-
bers enables studies on intra-household dynamics and inequality. Third, the wide range
of survey sample of 12 provinces with both urban and rural areas enables me to observe
3,244 families with children of mixed-sex, which is a rare find in China under the One
Child Policy. Fourth, the CHNS collects dietary intake information of all household mem-
bers over the course of three days. The collection of dietary intakes is on a 24-hour-recall
basis, and employs strict measures of changes in food stock, making the data quality ob-
jective and precise. The detailed information of dietary intake data collection and calcula-
tion is the following:
Food intake is measured at the household level as well the individual level (i.e. both
children and parents) over three consecutive days of the survey. The three survey days
are randomly distributed across seven days of a week. The household level of food in-
take is calculated by the change in food inventory from the beginning to the end of each
day. It is measured with a weighing and measuring technique using Chinese balance scale
ranging from 20 grams (1 liang) to 15 kilograms (30 jin). The nutritionists measure all
the food items before the initiation of a 3-day survey period (a0), all purchases and home
production (a1) during the survey period, and the food discarded and remaining food at
2The CHNS panel runs from 1991 to 2011. The number of occurrences is also restrained by the age of
the child in the sample (2 to 17 years).
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the end of each day (a2). The food consumption of household level is therefore defined as
a0 + a1 − a2.
Every household member reports all food consumed at home and away from home
on a 24-hour recall basis3. Mothers or caregivers who handle food preparation are asked
to recall the food consumption of children younger than 12 years old. Nutritionists record
the types of food and snacks, the method of cooking, as well as the time and place of con-
sumption. Mothers, or those who handle the food preparations, together with other house-
hold members provide information on shared dishes to determine the amount of individual
intake. More than 99% survey respondents have reported full three days of data (China
Health and Nutrition Survey , 2017).
To calculate the daily intake of macronutrients including carbohydrates, fat, protein,
and energy, the 1991 Food Composition Table for China is used as an average amount on
a dish-by-dish basis for survey cycles prior to 2004. The 2002 Food Composition Table is
used in the subsequent surveys cycles of 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011.
The CHNS implements strict quality control procedures. It follows the Declaration
of Helsinki, and the survey protocols, instruments, and process are approved by the in-
stitutional review committees of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The
written consent was obtained from all survey respondents. The food intake at the house-
hold level is matched with the individual level data. If a significant discrepancy is found
between the sum of individual level data and the household data, the CHNS revisits the
family to resolve the inconsistency. Field workers are trained nutritionists who have post-
secondary degrees and professional work experience in nutrition. The CHNS also provides
three days of training on dietary data collection to the field workers before the survey
(China Health and Nutrition Survey , 2017).
Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs)
I use the Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs)4 to adjust for the nutrient needs accord-
ing to the growth of children and the gender- and age-specific requirements for parents
(see Table 1). The DRIs table is developed by the Institute of Medicine at the National
Academies of Sciences Engineering Medicine and is widely used in many international
studies including the U.S. Guidelines for Americans, National Health and Nutrition Ex-
amination Survey and the Canadian Community Health Survey. It provides guidelines
in daily consumption of energy, carbohydrate, protein and fat intakes for 97% to 98%
healthy individuals to meet nutrient requirements. The values are based on the recom-
mended Physical Activity Level (PLA) of 1.6 to 1.7 in healthy individuals, which means
the total energy consumption is 60% to 70% of the resting energy expenditure, and it is
equivalent of 60 minutes of daily physical activity (Trumbo et al., 2002). The DRIs also
take into account pregnant and lactating women, as these special stages require higher
levels of nutrition intake. The adjustments are used when the analysis is done for chil-
dren’s mothers in the later section.
3According to the CHNS, 12% breakfast, 11% lunch and 5% dinner are consumed away from home.
Home cooking accounts for 70% to 80% during the three-day survey period.
4There are other food intake standards, such as the adult equivalence scale of food energy intake as
adopted in Osberg (2015b). The advantage of the DRIs standards is that it provides not only the overall
calorie intakes but also the protein, carbohydrate, and fat intakes.
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The dependent variable is children or parents’ percentage deviation in macronutri-
ent intakes from the DRIs in the age- and gender-specific group5.
IntakeDevi = (Intakei −DRIs)/DRIs (1)
Table 2 shows summary statistics using the pooled sibling sample (with and with-
out negative income shocks). A high-carbohydrate and low-protein diet is found in boys,
girls, fathers and mothers. For example, the carbohydrate intake is 152.9% for boys and
138.7% for girls relative to the DRIs standards, while the protein intake is only 70.3% for
boys and 59.7% for girls. This result is consistent with previous findings of lower protein-
energy ratios in developing countries (Millward & Jackson, 2003). The overall energy in-
take is 110.7% for boys and 99.8% for girls. The fat intakes are 60.2% for boys and 51.5%
for girls.
In all macronutrient categories, consistently lower intakes of girls are observed com-
pared to boys in the same families with gaps ranging from 9 to 15 percentage points.
Their parents’ nutrition intakes exhibit the similar patterns as the children. On average,
fathers of boys’ energy intake is 169.3% while mothers of boys’ intake is 143.5%. The dis-
crepancy highlights gender differences in dietary intakes among parents.
Table 2 also validates the sample of selection for boys and girls. Statistically iden-
tical results are shown between the parents of girls and the parents of boys. For example,
when comparing the energy intake for mothers of boys to mothers’ of girls, the average is
143.5% for both. The result suggests that the girls and boys are selected from the statisti-
cally identical sample.
Negative income shock and its reasons
Hacker et al. (2014) propose the “Economic Security Index” using the frequency of a
25% decline in individual net CPI-adjusted income from one year to the next. I adopt this
criterion of a “large” income shock and define the negative income shocks as the equivalent
income loss (from all sources) more than 25% of the average of most recent three income
observed6.
NegShockit = 0 if
Yit − Y¯i
Y¯i
> −0.25;
NegShockit = 1 if
Yit − Y¯i
Y¯i
≤ −0.25 (2)
where Yit is equivalent income of current cycle (i.e. family income from all sources divided
by square root of household size); and Y¯i = (Yit + Yit−1 + Yit−2)/3. Data are trimmed so
that negative income is equal to zero. I ignore negative income because many families who
are in business, farming, gardening, fishing, or raising livestock report negative income.
The nature of such business is to invest for a few years and thus generating negative in-
come, but a large return in the future is expected (China Health and Nutrition Survey ,
2017).
5The raw intakes are trimmed so that the observations above the top and below bottom 1% are equal
to the top and the bottom 1% respectively.
6The 25% income fall from the recent three-year average may lead to a larger income shock than from
the previous year. I also examine the 25% income loss from the previous year and the results are highly
consistent.
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Types of economic risks. Osberg (1998) outlined four aspects of economic risks iden-
tified in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights: unemployment, ill-
ness, family dissolution, and old age. In the CHNS data, the four risks can be identified
by the following questions:
• Unemployment: Changed or lost jobs since the last survey.
• Illness: Self-reported health of 1 or 2 on a 4-point scale, or self-reported hyperten-
sion, diabetes, myocardial diseases, stroke or cancer.
• Family dissolution: Single, divorced, widowed or separated.
• Old age: male older than 60 and female older than 557.
For simplicity, the child is coded in the category if either parent is in the category. Table
3 shows the percentage of children associated with each economic risk by families with or
without a significant negative income shock (25% of equivalent income loss). For children
who experience a negative income shock in the family, 35% experience illness of parents,
17% have unemployment, 3% have family breakups, and 0.3% have old aged parents. The
families without negative income shock have a lower economic risk in each category except
for old age.
Dietary knowledge. The CHNS also asks respondents 12-year and older diet knowl-
edge in the cycles 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. To infer the overall energy intake, fat, car-
bohydrates, protein and body image, the five questions are selected: Do you strongly agree
(5), agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree (1) with the following
statements:
• Eating a large amount of sugar is good for health.
• Eating food high in fat is good for health.
• Eating a large amount of staple food is good for health.
• Eating a large amount of animal products (e.g. fish, poultry, eggs, and lean pork)
every day ia good for health.
• The heavier you are, the healthier you are.
Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of each question answered by chil-
dren in the families with and without negative income shock. Children experiencing a neg-
ative income shock rated higher for all questions compare to children without a negative
income shock.
Child sample
The sample of this study consists of children of 2 to 17-year-old8 in the survey years
of 1991 to 2011. The birth cohort of the children is from 1973 to 2009. In the CHNS chil-
dren sample, 36% of the children are from only-child families and 3,357 children have had
one or more siblings of the opposite sex9.
I limit the sample of analysis to families with more than one child of the opposite
sex for sibling fixed effects analyses. At least one girl and one boy are observed in each
7The average retirement age in China is 60 for men and 55 for women (Dorfman et al., 2013)
8Children and infants who are younger than 2-year-old are likely breastfed and the dietary intakes are
thus incomparable.
9I also investigate if the first borns are favoured in families with children of the same sex. No signifi-
cant patterns are found
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family, and at least two children are observed in each family in each nutrition survey year.
The sample consists of 3,243 children and 1,364 households, with 20% of children observed
four times, 28% three times, and 34% twice in the longitudinal sample.
There are 2,667 boys and 2,908 girls in the sample (see Table 2). The average birth
order for boys is 1.9 and for girls is 1.6. The difference is statistically significant, and it
can be explained by the One Child Policy, which permits the second birth in rural area if
the first child is a girl. Other demographic variables are consistent across genders. In the
sample, 11.4% of boys and 11.8% of girls experience negative income shock (25% income
decline than the average in recent three cycles). On average, the equivalent household in-
come is 7325 CPI-adjusted-2006 Yuan. Rural children account for 81% of the sample. On
average, there are 2.5 children and 2.5 extra household members in a family. In the sam-
ple of analysis. 33% of children have completed primary schooling, and 20% have com-
pleted middle schooling. 43% of the children reached the age of puberty.
Siblings under the One Child Policy
How does the sibling sample in this study compare with the only-child sample?
Even under the China One Child Policy, siblings are still commonly observed in Chinese
families. Culturally and historically, Chinese families are in favour for having more chil-
dren. Mao Zedong, the chairman of China from 1949 to 1976, advocated “more people,
more power” and believed a rising population is a major drive for economic growth. After
Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took power. Deng believed in population control and
promoted the growth in GDP per capita. The Chinese government thus enacted the One
Child Policy in 1979 (Peng, 1991).
The One Child Policy was resisted by Chinese families, especially in the rural ar-
eas. In 1984 and 1985, the communist government relaxed the policy so that rural families
with one daughter could have a second child. The fertility rate, therefore, rebounded from
1984 to 1986. Besides of the less stringent implementation in rural areas, the One Child
Policy was also relatively relaxed in less developed provinces and ethnic minority groups.
Figure2 shows the fertility rate in the urban and rural area from 1973 to 2009. The fertil-
ity rates were 5 and 2.4 in the rural and urban area respectively in 1973, and the figures
became 1.4 and 0.96 in 2009. Therefore, for the birth cohort of this study from 1973 to
2009, it is common for Chinese families to have siblings.
Figure 3 presents mean and standard errors of percentage deviation of children’s
and parents’ macro-nutrient intake from the DRIs standards by gender and only-child sta-
tus. Protein intakes of Chinese children in all groups are significantly lower than the in-
ternational standard. Boys have more protein than girls in both only child and non-only-
child families. On average, Chinese boys in non-only-child families have 79% of the pro-
tein, comparing to Chinese girls in non-only-child families having 68% of the protein using
DRIs standards. In only-child-families, the protein intake is higher for both genders—83%
for boys and 76% for girls. Fat intake shows the same pattern as the protein intake with
a smaller gap from the DRIs standards. On the contrary, carbohydrate intakes of Chi-
nese children are relatively high, especially in non-only-child families. Boys with siblings
consume 130% and girls with siblings consume 120% of carbohydrates intake standard.
Carbohydrate intakes are 107% and 76% of the DRIs standards for only-child boys and
girls respectively. The total energy intake is highest among boys with siblings, and lowest
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among only-child girls.
The shortage of protein intake and excess of carbohydrate intake are even more
prominent among parents. Fathers’ protein intakes range from 36% to 41% of the interna-
tional standard, while father’s carbohydrate intake is 1.7 to 2.4 times of the international
standard. Mothers, on average, consume 48% of protein, and 1.7 times carbohydrates of
the DRIs standards. Both mothers and fathers consume smaller amounts of fat in non-
only-child families than those in only-child families, but higher total energy intakes con-
tributed by high carbohydrate intakes10.
Empirical framework
Sibling fixed effect model
In economic literature, most studies on children estimate child outcomes on a set of
observables of family and child characteristics. Two concerns are raised by this approach,
unobserved heterogeneity and income endogeneity (Dahl & Lochner, 2012). Mayer (1997),
among others, suggests that the estimation omits unobserved heterogeneities across house-
holds. For example, children’s outcomes could be driven by factors (neighbourhood, family
environment and child’s ability) other than income. In the Chinese context, the One-Child
Policy boosted gender selection practice using ultrasound technology since its introduc-
tion in the 1980s (Chen et al., 2013). The availability of gender-selected abortions differs
across provinces, urban or rural, economic status and family values, which contributes to
the selection bias of girls and boys families. It is possible that girls may be more likely
from disadvantaged families because their families cannot afford ultrasound scanning or
abortions.
To remove the permanent unobserved family and children characteristics, I use sib-
ling fixed effects as adopted by Blau (1999) and Levy & Duncan (2000). I estimate the
differences in dietary intakes between brothers and sisters within the same households.
Differences in family levels across siblings are removed when estimating the impacts of
negative income shocks on child outcomes. The fixed effects model also enables me to
compare the dietary intakes with and without negative income shock, and thus estimating
the changes in dietary intakes in response to negative incomes. I employ three estimations
on children, parents, and the combination of parent-children.
First, I estimate child dietary intakes with sibling fixed effects as follows:
IntakeDevijt = αj + β0NegShockjt ·Girlij + β1NegShockjt + Γ1Xjt + Γ2Wijt + ijt (3)
where i indexes individuals (i.e. children in this equation), j indexes families, and t in-
dexes survey year. IntakeDev is percentage deviation of energy, carbohydrate, fat and pro-
tein intake from the age- and gender-specific Dietary Reference Intake standard. X is a
vector of family-specific characteristics. W is a vector of observed child-specific character-
istics. Standard errors are clustered at the family level.
10I examine the intergenerational gender inequality among only-child families using propensity score
matching, and found that the gender inequality is only significant among families with children of mixed-
sex.
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The sibling fixed effects are captured by αj , which reflect unobserved permanent
family characteristics.The hypothesis is that β0 < 0, which suggests in response to neg-
ative income shocks, girls reduce their macronutrient intakes more than boys in the same
families.
Second, I examine the parents’ dietary intakes using the same children’s sample.
IntakeDevijt = αj +β0NegShockjt ·Motherij +β1NegShockjt+Γ1Xjt+Γ2Wijt+ijt (4)
where i indexes individuals (parent in this equation). The dependent variable
IntakeDevijt is percentage deviation of the father or the mother’s energy, carbohydrate,
fat or protein intake from the DRIs standards. NegShockjt estimates the overall effects of
negative income shocks on both the father and the mother, and NegShockjt · Motherij
captures the extra effects on the mother in the same household.
Third, I combine the child sample and the parent sample estimated above, and test
if parents shield their children from dietary reductions when economic hardships strike.
By estimating the dietary intakes of two generations, I can investigate the resource reallo-
cation among fathers, mothers, sons and daughters in the same households.
IntakeDevijt = αj+β0NegShockjt ·Girlij
+β1NegShockjt ·Motherij
+β2NegShockjt · Fatherij
+β3NegShockjt + Γ1Xjt + Γ2Wijt + ijt (5)
where i indexes family members. The base of NegShock effects is boys, and the interac-
tion terms of NegShock with girls, mothers and fathers capture the extra effects on each
individual.
Other controls
For all sibling fixed effects estimation, I present 3 specifications. First specification
controls the number of children in the families, if there is/are grandparent(s) or relatives
present. The second specification adds if the child graduated from primary school or mid-
dle school, the birth order of the child, and if the child entered puberty 11. The last speci-
fication adds the log equivalent income of the current period12.
Figure 4 shows the means and standard errors of independent variables by child
gender and only-child status. There are 10% of non-only-child families in the pooled sam-
ple experiencing negative income shock, while only 6% of only-child families had negative
income shock. The only-child and non-only child families differ in demographic character-
istics. According to Figure 4, only-child families have more household members other than
children and parents. There is a higher percentage of only-children who completed mid-
dle school than non-only children. Equivalent income is 7,738 for non-only-child families
and 14,770 for only-child families. 80% non-only child families and 59% of the only-child
families are in rural area.
11Girls entering puberty if the answer is "Yes" to the question "Have you ever menstruated?" and boys
entering puberty is defined as at 11 to 18 (Zhu et al. (2013)
12Equivalent income is defined as household income from all sources after tax and transfer in 2006
Yuan divided by the square root of household size (Luxembourg Income Study , 2017).
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Results
Boys and girls’ intakes
Table 4 shows the estimates of child nutrition intake using sibling fixed effects. The
hypothesis is that negative income shocks affect boys’ intakes less than girls’, i.e. sons are
favoured during tough times. I examine three nutrition intakes, carbohydrates, fat and
protein, as well as the overall energy intakes (the combination of the three nutrition). For
each outcome, I use three specifications: the first one controls for time-variant household
characteristics; the second one controls for household characteristics and child-specific
characteristics; and the third specification adds the current equivalent income as control.
While the variables of interests are negative income shock and its interaction(s), equiva-
lent income in fixed effects model also captures the changes in income. Therefore, the sec-
ond specification is the preferred specification. The income variable is added in the third
specification to estimate the “extra” critical point effects of 25% income fall.
Column 1 in Table 4 shows energy intake of children increases in response to a neg-
ative income shock, controlling for family characteristics. A 25% of income shock increases
energy intake by 9.9 percentage points in terms of the DRIs standards. After accounting
for household and child characteristics, the interaction of negative shock and girl becomes
significant. Girls reduce their energy intake by 7 percentage points, while boys’ energy is
not significantly affected.
Carbohydrate intake is also significantly affected by negative income shocks. Col-
umn 4 shows that carbohydrate intake increases by 21.3 percentage points for boys, and
by 13.9 (=0.213-0.074) percentage points for girls. After controlling for child-specific
characteristics, the estimation still shows a 12.4-percentage-point increase in boys, but a
2.4-percentage-point decrease in girls. In the preferred specification in Column 6, a 14-
percentage-point increase in boys, and a 0.5-percentage-point decrease in girls is estimated
after controlling for income.
The sibling fixed effects estimation shows that protein intake reduces for both girls
and boys when income falls 25% (see Columns 10-12, Table 4). With controls for families
observed and permanent unobserved characteristics, boys’ protein intakes decrease by 15.2
percentage points, and girls’ protein intakes decrease by 24.9 percentage points. The mag-
nitude of reductions is significant considering the average of protein intake is only 70.3%
of DRIs standard for boys and 59.7% for girls. The results persist even after controlling
for income. There is a 16-percentage-point decrease for protein intake for all children. The
interaction term of negative shock and girl becomes insignificant.
On the contrary to the previous finding of a positive relationship between fat diet
and economic insecurity, no change in fat intake of children is found due to negative in-
come shocks.
Sample of adolescents. Adolescence is a critical transition period, and many biolog-
ical, psychological and social roles are formed during this life stage. It is the foundation
of future development (Sawyer et al., 2012). I limit the sample to adolescents and test if
the gender disparity is larger during this life period. The adolescent sample is defined as
girls from menstruation to 17-year-old and boys from 11-year old until 17-year-old (World
Health Organization, 2017). There are 1,391 boys and 1,005 girls in the adolescent sample,
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which accounts for 43% of the full sibling sample13.
Table 5 presents the sibling fixed effects estimates of dietary intakes on negative
income shocks. Columns 1 to 3 show that daily energy intake is significantly reduced by
18.2 to 21.1 percentage points in the presence of negative income shocks for girls, while no
reduction of energy intakes for boys. This result is consistent across three specifications.
This result suggests a higher gender disparity among adolescents than the previous esti-
mate with full sibling sample.
Girls also experience a large decrease in carbohydrate intake. After controlling for
household and child-specific characteristics, the carbohydrate intake decreases by 29.4
percentage points for girls. Boys, on the contrary, is estimated a 24.4-percentage-point
increase in carbohydrate intake in Column 6. After controlling for income, girls still expe-
rience a 5-percentage-point of carbohydrate intake reduction, which is a 29.4-percentage-
point difference between boys and girls. This result suggests that the boys eat more and
the girls reduce their carbohydrate intakes in response to a negative income shock.
Negative income shocks have negative effects on the fat intake of adolescent girls.
Columns 7 to 9 in Table 5 show the fat intake reduces by 18.2 to 20.1 percentage points
for girls. Boys fat intake show no significant change. The average fat intake for girls is
only 51.5% of the DRIs standard, while for boys is 60.2% (see Table 2). The reduction in
fat intake due to the negative income shock puts adolescent girls in a more disadvantaged
diet than their boy counterparts.
The protein intake is estimated to be negatively affected by income shock for both
genders (see Column 10 in Table 5). Boys’ protein intake is estimated to be reduced by
11.0 percentage points, while girls are expected to reduce a further 8.5% in protein intake,
totalling 19.5-percentage-point reduction. The effects on both girls and boys become in-
significant after controlling for income.
Overall, the estimates of the adolescent sample show a larger gender disparity be-
tween boys and girls within the household. In response to negative income shock, girls in
the adolescent sample intake 19.3 percentage points less of energy, 29.4 less of carbohy-
drate, and 19.6 less of fat, compared to boys in the same households. Considering girls
have lower intakes than boys using the DRIs standards, the dietary reductions from the
income loss is particularly problematic.
Fathers’ and mothers’ intakes
Table 6 presents the estimates of parents’ dietary intakes with family fixed effects.
The hypothesis is that mothers take a larger dietary cut than fathers in response to nega-
tive income shocks. The differential effects of negative income shock between mothers and
fathers are captured by NegShock ·Mother.
Columns 1 to 9 show negative coefficients of NegShock · Mother, which means
mothers reduce energy, carbohydrate, and fat intakes significantly more than fathers. The
estimates are highly consistent across three specifications. Compared to fathers, moth-
ers reduce 29 to 31 percentage points more in energy, 47 to 50 percentage points more in
carbohydrates, and 25 to 27 percentage points more in fat intakes in response to negative
income shocks. The only exception is protein intake. On average, a 6.02-percentage-point
13I also examine the early childhood sample of 2-to-5-year-olds, as Heckman (2011) outlines the impor-
tance of invest in the early years. I do not find a significant gender disparity in the sample of early years.
Page 13
reduction is found in fathers protein intake, while a 1.75 (=-0.0602+0.0427)-percentage-
point reduction in mothers’ protein intake. There is no evidence of significant reduction
in father’s dietary intakes except for protein intakes. On the contrary, an increase in car-
bohydrate intakes of 12.6 to 19.1 percentage points is found in specifications 1 and 2 (see
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 6)
Parents’ and children’s intakes
Table 7 presents the family fixed effects estimates of both parents and children us-
ing the same sample of siblings of mixed-sex. The coefficient of NegShock is the overall
effects of negative income shocks on the family, and the interactions are the extra effects
on girls, mothers and fathers using boys as the base.
The results are mostly consistent across three specifications. For simplicity, I use
specification 2 for result interpretations. Negative income shocks significantly reduce en-
ergy, carbohydrate, and protein intakes of boys. Fathers experience increases in energy,
carbohydrate intakes. Girls reduce energy, carbohydrate, fat and protein intakes more
than boys in the same families. The gaps of the macronutrient intakes between boys and
girls are 11.3 percentage points in energy and 17.5 percentage points in carbohydrates,
7.63 percentage points in fat, and 6.01 percentage points in protein. Mothers in the same
families reduce intakes the most. On average, mothers reduce additional 14.0 percentage
points in energy, 18.6 percentage points in carbohydrates, and 18.4 percentage points in
protein intakes to the sons’ dietary reduction.
Figure 5 presents the energy intake allocation with and without negative income
shock. I use the mean of the sample and the estimates from Column 2 in Table 7 to calcu-
late the percentage deviations of energy intakes with and without negative income shocks.
The percentage deviation of energy intake from DRIs standard is labelled. The energy
intakes show a 3-percentage-point increase for fathers, a 7-percentage-point decrease for
sons, a 19-percentage-point decrease for daughters, and a 22-percentage-point decrease for
mothers.
To interpret the results more intuitively, I convert the percentage-point of energy
reduction into the rice consumption using the United States Department of Agriculture
Food Composition Database. On average, a 22-percentage-point decrease in energy intake
for mothers means a 166.6-gram daily reduction in cooked rice. A 19-percentage-point de-
crease for daughters is equivalent to a 134.7-gram rice reduction. A 7-percentage-point
decrease for sons reduces rice consumption by 49.9 grams.
The estimates of Table 7 highlight the order of resource redistribution in the event
of income shocks: macronutrients allocate to fathers first, sons second, daughters third,
and the mothers last. Fathers, as the main bread earners of families, are likely to be
supported first to ensure future income. Although it is not officially documented by the
CHNS, mothers or housewives are usually the main food handlers in the family. The
largest reduction in mothers are likely to be explained by the altruistic sacrifice towards
their children.
Robustness check
The specifications so far assume that the negative income shock takes effects at a
25% threshold. However, Osberg (2015a) argues that the 25% cut is a rather arbitrary
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threshold. I, therefore, test the income loss of 20% and 30%. The results are consistent. I
also test the estimation by using a continuous measure of income loss. Instead of using a
binary variable of negative income shock, the proportionate income loss is used and it is
defined as the following:
IncomeFallit =
Yit − Yit−1
Yit−1
if Yit ≤ Yit−1;
IncomeFallit = 0 if Yit > Yit−1 (6)
Table 8 shows the sibling fixed effects estimates of dietary intake using the continuous
measures. To be comparable with the previous estimation, it starts with simple specifi-
cation and gradually adds more controls. Specification 1 controls for household character-
istics. Specification 2 adds child characteristics, and Specification 3 controls for all includ-
ing log equivalent income. All specifications estimate for percentage deviation of energy,
carbohydrate, fat and protein intakes from the DRIs standard.
Column 1 in Table 8 shows that when income falls by one percentage point, the en-
ergy intake increases by 0.12 percentage points of the DRIs standard controlling for house-
hold characteristics. The girls’ daily intake of overall energy is 0.08 percentage points
lower than boys. The effects of income fall become stronger after controlling for child-
specific characteristics and income. Column 3 shows that one percentage point in income
fall from the previous cycle, boys increases energy intake by 0.23 percentage points. Al-
ternatively, a one standard deviation increase in income fall leads to a 9.2% of standard
deviations increase in energy intake14. Girls’ energy intake is significantly lower than boys.
For one standard deviation of income fall, girls energy intake increase by 2.9%.
Columns 3 to 12 in Table 8 break down the energy intake into types of macronutri-
ent. The estimates of carbohydrate in three specifications show consistent positive effects
from income fall as shown in row 2. %IncomeFall is positive, meaning the income fall in-
creases carbohydrate intake, and %IncomeFall*Girl is negative, meaning the effects on
carbohydrate intake is negative on girls compared to their brothers. The preferred speci-
fication of Column 6 shows that a 100% income fall increases carbohydrate intake by 42.1
percentage points for boys, and 15.3 percentage points (=0.42.1-0.268) in girls. In other
words, one standard deviation decrease in income, increases carbohydrate intake by 11.3%
standard deviations in boys, and 4.1% standard deviations in girls. Fat intakes are not
statistically significant. Protein intake is reduced in both genders, with a larger reduction
in girls. A unit of income fall leads to a reduction of protein intake by 0.255 units of for
boys, and by 0.378 (=-0.255-0.123) units for girls. If the income decreases by 1 standard
deviation, the protein intake would decrease by 8.9% standard deviations for boys and
13.2% standard deviations for girls.
Table 9 shows larger effects of income fall using adolescents sample. For one unit of
income fall, energy intake increases by 0.386 percentage points in boys, and 0.052 percent-
age points in girls; carbohydrate intake increases by 0.727 percentage points in boys, and
0.194 percentage points in girls. In other words, one standard deviation in income fall in-
crease energy intake by 14.2% standard deviations in boys, and 1.9% standard deviations
14It is calculated using the coefficient multiplied by the standard deviation of income fall, divided by
the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
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in girls, and increase carbohydrate intake by 19.0% in boys, and 5.0% in girls. Changes in
fat and protein intake are insignificant in the adolescent sample.
The estimates using the percentage income fall show that children’s food intake and
nutrition allocation is affected by the level of income fall continuously. The average effects
show that boys and girls increase the carbohydrate intake and decrease the protein intake
in response to income losses. The increase in carbohydrate is less but the decrease in pro-
tein is more for girls.
I also test quadratic form of income loss. The quadratic term is not significant. Be-
sides the sample of children with siblings of opposite sex, I examine the children with sib-
lings of the same sex. I do not find any dietary orders or patterns within the families, such
as the first-born preference.
Conclusion
This study draws the following conclusions. First, protein and fat intakes of Chinese
children are significantly lower, while carbohydrate and overall energy intakes are higher,
than the DRIs standard. In all four categories, girls have significantly lower intake lev-
els than boys, suggesting a gender disparity before the negative income shocks take place.
Second, in response to negative income, Chinese families tend to reduce their protein in-
take, the primary macronutrient, possibly due to a higher price. Third, adolescent girls
experience a larger dietary reduction than boys in energy, carbohydrate, and fat intakes.
The most compelling finding is that when families experience negative income
shocks, the resource is allocated in the order of fathers, sons, daughters and mothers.
Gender inequality is heightened in the event of income loss. The prioritizing fathers and
sons, while neglecting daughters and mothers show an increase in gender disparity in re-
sponse to large income loss. It draws concerns that economic losses are likely to impede
the development of daughters and obstructs the well-being of mothers.
Birch & Fisher (1998) documents that eating behaviour during childhood and ado-
lescence can have significant influences on future food intake. Parental dietary practices
can alter dietary intake patterns, preferences for energy-dense foods, and even the inter-
nal responsiveness to hunger and satiety in children and in future adulthood. The phe-
nomenon of “feeding the little emperor” in response to negative income shocks in Chinese
families is especially problematic for children’s future development, and could contribute
to unhealthy eating habits and adult obesity.
It is unclear that the differences in dietary intake are caused by parental control,
or if it stems from the children themselves. The gender difference could come from the
children themselves. Sons could be more expressive about their demands than daughters.
Girls, especially adolescent girls, may be more reserved about their requests and “inter-
nalize” their demand. Also, sons may be more likely to demand food, and girls may re-
quest resources other than food (e.g. clothing or beauty products). When dealing with
children’s demands, parents may be more likely to give in when they are under economic
stress.
One of the limitations is that I focus on families with sex-mixed children. It is also
interesting to examine if father or mother would reduce more intakes in only child fami-
lies. Given the presence of grandparents and their involvements in child care in China, the
dietary intakes of grandparents could also be examined.
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I only examine macronutrient intakes but not micronutrient intakes. Micronutri-
ents, such as vitamins and minerals, play an important role in the healthy development of
children. For future research, other dietary intakes could be examined when such data are
available.
Another direction of future research is to include the price of food in the analysis.
The CHNS provides detailed information on the price of rice, bread, meat, and oil in the
local market. It would be interesting to examine if the negative income shock makes fami-
lies opt out from expensive protein and opt in for cheap carbohydrate.
Apart from dietary intakes, it would be interesting to also examine time and con-
sumption allocation within the household. For obesity research, for example, time spent in
physical activity, TV and video games could be investigated and gender differences could
be explored. The consumption patterns, such as pocket money (Ling Hua Qian) distribu-
tion and the frequency of western fast food restaurant visits, are also worthy of attention.
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Appendix I: Tables
Table 1: Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs): Recommended Dietary Allowances and Adequate
Macronutrients Intakes
Carbohydrate Fat Protein Energy
Group (g/d) (g/d) (g/d) calorie
Infants
0 to 6 mo 60 31 9 555.4
6 to 12 mo 95 30 11 694
Children 0
1-3y 130 30 13 842
4-8y 130 30 19 866
Males 30 270
9-13y 130 30 34 926
14-18y 130 30 52 998
19-30y 130 30 56 1014
31-50y 130 30 56 1014
51-70y 130 30 56 1014
>70y 130 30 56 1014
Females 30 270
9-13y 130 30 34 926
14-18y 130 30 46 974
19-30y 130 30 46 974
31-50y 130 30 46 974
51-70y 130 30 46 974
>70y 130 30 46 974
Pregnancy 30 270
14-18y 175 30 71 1254
19-30y 175 30 71 1254
31-50y 175 30 71 1254
Lactation 30 270
14-18y 210 30 71 1394
19-30y 210 30 71 1394
31-50y 210 30 71 1394
Source: Dietary Reference Intakes for Energy, Carbohydrate, Fiber, Fat, Fatty Acids, Cholesterol, Protein, and
Amino Acids (2002/2005) and Dietary Reference Intakes for Water, Potassium, Sodium, Chloride, and Sulfate
(2005). The report may be accessed via www.nap.edu.
Fat intake of 1 to 70-year-old is from Dietary Reference Intakes (DRIs): Acceptable Macronutrient Distribution
Ranges. The average of the range is used. Energy intake is calculated by the author using
Energy(calorie)=9xFat(g)+4xCarb(g)+4xProtein(g). Energy from alcohol intake is ignored from the calculation
because of lack of data. It is not likely to affects the estimation as the subject of the study is children of 2 to
17-year-old who are not likely to consume alcohol.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of sibling sample of analysis
Boy Girl
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD
Energy % dev 2,667 1.107 0.643 2,908 0.998 0.608
Carb % dev 2,667 1.529 0.919 2,908 1.387 0.848
Fat % dev 2,667 0.602 0.953 2,908 0.515 0.910
Protein % dev 2,667 0.703 0.725 2,908 0.597 0.655
Father Energy % deviation 2,488 1.693 0.726 2,699 1.696 0.736
Father Carb % deviation 2,488 2.466 1.120 2,699 2.466 1.136
Father Fat % deviation 2,488 1.088 1.162 2,699 1.102 1.197
Father Protein % deviation 2,488 0.405 0.435 2,699 0.411 0.438
Mother Energy % deviation 2,618 1.435 0.659 2,855 1.435 0.669
Mother Carb % deviation 2,618 2.070 0.988 2,855 2.063 0.996
Mother Fat % deviation 2,618 0.832 1.021 2,855 0.844 1.053
Mother Protein % deviation 2,618 0.482 0.464 2,855 0.490 0.469
%IncomeFall*Girl 2,362 0 0 2,563 0.124 0.240
%IncomeFall 2,362 0.122 0.238 2,563 0.124 0.240
NegativeShock*Girl 2,667 0 0 2,908 0.118 0.322
NegativeShock 2,667 0.114 0.318 2,908 0.118 0.322
Loss30 2,667 0.164 0.370 2,908 0.166 0.373
Loss20 2,667 0.190 0.393 2,908 0.192 0.394
Number of children 2,667 2.485 0.649 2,908 2.577 0.758
Number of extra hh members 2,667 2.453 0.813 2,908 2.461 0.846
Primary Schooling 2,667 0.313 0.464 2,908 0.338 0.473
Middle Schooling 2,667 0.175 0.380 2,908 0.220 0.414
Child at the age of puberty 2,667 0.522 0.500 2,908 0.346 0.476
Birth order 2,667 1.915 0.845 2,908 1.600 0.771
Equivalent Income 2,667 7,221 8,581 2,908 7,423 9,119
Rural residents 2,667 0.814 0.389 2,908 0.813 0.390
Number of families 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2011. Children 2 to 17 year old. Sample of children with siblings of opposite sex. At least
two children in one family are surveyed in one cycle.
Note: % dev of energy, carb, fat and protein is the percentage deviation of macronutrient intake from the age- and
gender-specific DRIs standards. Equivalent income is defined as household income after tax and transfer divided by
square root of household size. NegShock is defined as 1 if the equivalent income falls more than 25% from the
average of previous 3 cycles, 0 otherwise. Loss30, Loss25, Loss20 are defined as the income loss of 30, 25 and 20
percent from the previous cycle
Page 22
T
ab
le
3:
R
ea
so
ns
fo
r
ne
ga
ti
ve
in
co
m
e
sh
oc
k
N
o
ne
gs
ho
ck
W
it
h
ne
g
sh
oc
k
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
N
M
ea
n
Sd
M
ax
M
in
N
M
ea
n
Sd
M
ax
M
in
R
ea
so
n
s
fo
r
n
eg
at
iv
e
in
co
m
e
sh
oc
k
Il
ln
es
s
2,
32
3
0.
31
3
0.
46
4
1
0
27
2
0.
34
6
0.
47
6
1
0
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
5,
95
6
0.
15
3
0.
36
0
1
0
68
8
0.
17
3
0.
37
8
1
0
Fa
m
ily
di
ss
ol
ut
io
n
5,
93
5
0.
01
36
0.
11
6
1
0
68
2
0.
03
23
0.
17
7
1
0
O
ld
ag
e
6,
01
4
0.
00
44
9
0.
06
69
1
0
69
5
0.
00
28
8
0.
05
36
1
0
C
h
an
n
el
s:
d
ie
ta
ry
at
ti
tu
d
e
D
ie
t
kn
ow
le
dg
e:
lo
t
of
su
ga
r
is
go
od
(1
-5
)
37
4
2.
21
4
0.
67
3
5
1
40
2.
62
5
0.
95
2
5
2
D
ie
t
kn
ow
le
dg
e:
di
et
hi
gh
in
fa
t
(1
-5
)
35
9
2.
22
8
0.
76
8
5
1
40
2.
32
5
0.
82
9
5
1
D
ie
t
kn
ow
le
dg
e:
lo
t
of
st
ap
le
fo
od
(1
-5
)
35
2
2.
86
1
0.
95
8
5
1
41
3.
19
5
0.
90
1
4
2
D
ie
t
kn
ow
le
dg
e:
lo
t
of
an
im
al
pr
od
uc
ts
(1
-5
)
37
9
2.
87
9
1.
03
2
5
1
41
3.
07
3
1.
05
8
5
1
D
ie
t
kn
ow
le
dg
e:
he
av
ie
r
bo
dy
(1
-5
)
38
0
1.
93
9
0.
66
1
5
1
40
2.
10
0
0.
87
1
5
1
N
um
be
r
of
fa
m
ili
es
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
1,
35
8
N
ot
e:
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t=
1
if
ei
th
er
pa
re
nt
ch
an
ge
d
or
lo
st
jo
bs
si
nc
e
th
e
la
st
su
rv
ey
.
Il
ln
es
s=
1
if
ei
th
er
pa
re
nt
ha
s
se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
he
al
th
of
1
or
2
on
a
4-
po
in
t
sc
al
e,
or
se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
hy
pe
rt
en
si
on
,
di
ab
et
es
,
m
yo
ca
rd
ia
l
di
se
as
es
,
st
ro
ke
or
ca
nc
er
.
Fa
m
ily
di
ss
ol
ut
io
n=
1
if
ei
th
er
pa
re
nt
re
po
rt
s
si
ng
le
,
di
vo
rc
ed
,
w
id
ow
ed
or
se
pa
ra
te
d.
O
ld
ag
e=
1
if
fa
th
er
is
ol
de
r
th
an
60
or
m
ot
he
r
is
ol
de
r
th
an
55
.
D
ie
t
kn
ow
le
dg
e
is
as
ke
d
fo
r
ch
ild
re
n
12
an
d
ol
de
r
in
cy
cl
es
20
04
to
20
11
.
5
re
pr
es
en
ts
st
ro
ng
ly
ag
re
e
an
d
1
is
st
ro
ng
ly
di
sa
gr
ee
.
Page 23
T
ab
le
4:
E
st
im
at
es
of
ch
ild
in
ta
ke
w
it
h
si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
,c
hi
ld
re
n
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
*G
ir
l
-0
.0
46
8
-0
.0
81
4*
*
-0
.0
75
4*
*
-0
.0
74
2*
-0
.1
48
**
*
-0
.1
45
**
*
-0
.0
16
5
-0
.0
10
8
-0
.0
11
3
-0
.0
96
7*
*
-0
.0
59
2
-0
.0
40
0
(0
.0
31
9)
(0
.0
32
0)
(0
.0
31
5)
(0
.0
44
8)
(0
.0
41
1)
(0
.0
41
3)
(0
.0
34
4)
(0
.0
39
0)
(0
.0
39
3)
(0
.0
38
2)
(0
.0
38
4)
(0
.0
38
2)
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
0.
09
92
**
*
0.
03
35
0.
05
37
0.
21
3*
**
0.
12
4*
**
0.
14
0*
**
0.
02
68
-0
.0
66
3
0.
03
04
-0
.1
52
**
*
-0
.0
60
8
-0
.1
60
**
*
(0
.0
37
0)
(0
.0
38
3)
(0
.0
41
1)
(0
.0
45
6)
(0
.0
46
0)
(0
.0
50
3)
(0
.0
55
4)
(0
.0
59
6)
(0
.0
66
7)
(0
.0
43
2)
(0
.0
43
9)
(0
.0
50
7)
Lo
g
eq
in
co
m
e
0.
02
64
0.
02
69
0.
08
64
**
*
-0
.0
82
7*
**
(0
.0
19
3)
(0
.0
23
0)
(0
.0
31
4)
(0
.0
22
9)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
6,
93
0
5,
64
5
5,
57
5
6,
93
0
5,
64
5
5,
57
5
6,
93
0
5,
64
5
5,
57
5
6,
93
0
5,
64
5
5,
57
5
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
8
0.
07
2
0.
07
4
0.
01
3
0.
13
4
0.
13
6
0.
00
9
0.
05
2
0.
05
7
0.
01
4
0.
13
6
0.
14
1
N
um
be
r
of
fix
ed
m
1,
38
0
1,
32
0
1,
31
2
1,
38
0
1,
32
0
1,
31
2
1,
38
0
1,
32
0
1,
31
2
1,
38
0
1,
32
0
1,
31
2
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
hi
ld
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
So
ur
ce
:
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
C
hi
ld
re
n
2
to
17
ye
ar
ol
d.
Sa
m
pl
e
of
ch
ild
re
n
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
A
t
le
as
t
tw
o
ch
ild
re
n
in
on
e
fa
m
ily
ar
e
su
rv
ey
ed
in
on
e
cy
cl
e.
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fa
m
ili
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
.1
;
**
p<
.0
5;
**
*p
<
.0
1.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
de
vi
at
io
n
of
m
ac
ro
nu
tr
ie
nt
in
ta
ke
fr
om
th
e
ag
e-
an
d
ge
nd
er
-s
pe
ci
fic
D
R
Is
st
an
da
rd
s.
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
an
d
nu
m
be
r
of
ot
he
r
re
la
ti
ve
an
d
no
n-
re
la
ti
ve
s
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
C
hi
ld
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
if
th
e
ch
ild
ha
s
gr
ad
ua
te
d
fr
om
pr
im
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
or
m
id
dl
e
sc
ho
ol
,
pu
be
rt
y
on
se
t
an
d
bi
rt
h
or
de
r.
L
og
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
is
de
fin
ed
as
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
co
m
e
af
te
r
ta
x
an
d
tr
an
sf
er
di
vi
de
d
by
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
.
C
on
st
an
t
is
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n.
N
eg
Sh
oc
k
is
de
fin
ed
as
1
if
th
e
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
fa
lls
m
or
e
th
an
25
%
fr
om
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
pr
ev
io
us
3
cy
cl
es
,
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
Page 24
T
ab
le
5:
E
st
im
at
es
of
ch
ild
in
ta
ke
w
it
h
si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
,c
hi
ld
re
n
of
se
x
m
ix
ad
ol
es
ce
nt
sa
m
pl
e.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
*G
ir
l
-0
.1
82
**
*
-0
.2
11
**
*
-0
.1
93
**
*
-0
.2
39
**
*
-0
.3
12
**
*
-0
.2
94
**
*
-0
.1
82
**
-0
.2
01
**
*
-0
.1
96
**
-0
.0
84
9*
-0
.0
18
8
0.
00
03
27
(0
.0
60
1)
(0
.0
62
4)
(0
.0
60
4)
(0
.0
83
3)
(0
.0
83
9)
(0
.0
84
6)
(0
.0
71
7)
(0
.0
77
2)
(0
.0
77
4)
(0
.0
50
4)
(0
.0
52
5)
(0
.0
51
6)
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
0.
01
11
0.
03
44
0.
09
24
0.
13
5
0.
16
0*
0.
24
4*
*
-0
.0
83
5
-0
.0
65
8
0.
01
98
-0
.1
10
**
-0
.0
89
7*
-0
.0
98
2
(0
.0
66
4)
(0
.0
66
1)
(0
.0
74
2)
(0
.0
85
9)
(0
.0
86
2)
(0
.0
96
3)
(0
.0
98
0)
(0
.0
97
0)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.0
55
4)
(0
.0
54
3)
(0
.0
61
6)
Lo
g
eq
in
co
m
e
0.
05
06
0.
07
85
*
0.
05
55
-0
.0
01
29
(0
.0
34
3)
(0
.0
44
7)
(0
.0
49
5)
(0
.0
30
0)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
46
8
2,
42
1
2,
39
6
2,
46
8
2,
42
1
2,
39
6
2,
46
8
2,
42
1
2,
39
6
2,
46
8
2,
42
1
2,
39
6
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
02
1
0.
02
9
0.
03
0
0.
02
6
0.
04
9
0.
05
1
0.
01
8
0.
02
3
0.
02
4
0.
02
5
0.
10
1
0.
09
8
N
um
be
r
of
fix
ed
m
1,
07
6
1,
06
0
1,
05
2
1,
07
6
1,
06
0
1,
05
2
1,
07
6
1,
06
0
1,
05
2
1,
07
6
1,
06
0
1,
05
2
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
hi
ld
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
So
ur
ce
:
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
C
hi
ld
re
n
2
to
17
ye
ar
ol
d.
Sa
m
pl
e
of
ch
ild
re
n
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
A
t
le
as
t
tw
o
ch
ild
re
n
in
on
e
fa
m
ily
ar
e
su
rv
ey
ed
in
on
e
cy
cl
e.
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fa
m
ili
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
.1
;
**
p<
.0
5;
**
*p
<
.0
1.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
de
vi
at
io
n
of
m
ac
ro
nu
tr
ie
nt
in
ta
ke
fr
om
th
e
ag
e-
an
d
ge
nd
er
-s
pe
ci
fic
D
R
Is
st
an
da
rd
s.
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
an
d
nu
m
be
r
of
ot
he
r
re
la
ti
ve
an
d
no
n-
re
la
ti
ve
s
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
C
hi
ld
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
if
th
e
ch
ild
ha
s
gr
ad
ua
te
d
fr
om
pr
im
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
or
m
id
dl
e
sc
ho
ol
,
pu
be
rt
y
on
se
t
an
d
bi
rt
h
or
de
r.
L
og
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
is
de
fin
ed
as
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
co
m
e
af
te
r
ta
x
an
d
tr
an
sf
er
di
vi
de
d
by
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
.
C
on
st
an
t
is
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n.
N
eg
Sh
oc
k
is
de
fin
ed
as
1
if
th
e
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
fa
lls
m
or
e
th
an
25
%
fr
om
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
pr
ev
io
us
3
cy
cl
es
,
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
Page 25
T
ab
le
6:
E
st
im
at
es
of
pa
re
nt
s’
in
ta
ke
s
w
it
h
fa
m
ily
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
,p
ar
en
ts
w
it
h
ch
ild
re
n
of
se
x
m
ix
sa
m
pl
e.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
*M
ot
he
r
-0
.2
89
**
*
-0
.3
05
**
*
-0
.2
85
**
*
-0
.4
71
**
*
-0
.4
98
**
*
-0
.4
63
**
*
-0
.2
70
**
*
-0
.2
46
**
*
-0
.2
46
**
*
0.
05
93
**
*
0.
03
32
*
0.
04
27
**
*
(0
.0
27
5)
(0
.0
28
0)
(0
.0
27
2)
(0
.0
40
3)
(0
.0
40
5)
(0
.0
39
5)
(0
.0
30
7)
(0
.0
31
8)
(0
.0
32
7)
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
17
0)
(0
.0
16
4)
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
0.
04
02
0.
07
56
*
0.
00
91
5
0.
12
6*
*
0.
19
1*
**
0.
04
78
0.
04
27
0.
00
94
5
0.
03
67
-0
.0
92
1*
**
-0
.0
56
2*
*
-0
.0
60
2*
*
(0
.0
43
6)
(0
.0
42
5)
(0
.0
48
4)
(0
.0
59
8)
(0
.0
56
6)
(0
.0
64
8)
(0
.0
67
4)
(0
.0
68
6)
(0
.0
78
7)
(0
.0
26
2)
(0
.0
25
9)
(0
.0
29
5)
Lo
g
eq
in
co
m
e
-0
.0
44
7*
*
-0
.1
02
**
*
0.
02
30
0.
00
25
3
(0
.0
20
4)
(0
.0
27
2)
(0
.0
34
3)
(0
.0
13
4)
C
on
st
an
t
1.
31
8*
**
2.
20
7*
**
2.
52
7*
**
1.
83
0*
**
3.
41
8*
**
4.
13
1*
**
1.
16
4*
**
0.
61
4*
0.
48
8
0.
23
8*
*
0.
96
0*
**
0.
94
8*
**
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.2
32
)
(0
.2
69
)
(0
.2
71
)
(0
.3
18
)
(0
.3
68
)
(0
.3
47
)
(0
.3
53
)
(0
.4
42
)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.1
66
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
13
,2
35
13
,1
41
12
,9
61
13
,2
35
13
,1
41
12
,9
61
13
,2
35
13
,1
41
12
,9
61
13
,2
35
13
,1
41
12
,9
61
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
02
5
0.
04
7
0.
04
7
0.
02
9
0.
06
4
0.
06
7
0.
00
5
0.
00
8
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
0.
03
6
0.
03
6
N
um
be
r
of
fix
ed
m
1,
37
3
1,
36
8
1,
36
0
1,
37
3
1,
36
8
1,
36
0
1,
37
3
1,
36
8
1,
36
0
1,
37
3
1,
36
8
1,
36
0
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
di
vi
du
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Fa
m
ily
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
So
ur
ce
:
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
C
hi
ld
re
n
2
to
17
ye
ar
ol
d.
Sa
m
pl
e
of
ch
ild
re
n
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
A
t
le
as
t
tw
o
ch
ild
re
n
in
on
e
fa
m
ily
ar
e
su
rv
ey
ed
in
on
e
cy
cl
e.
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fa
m
ili
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
.1
;
**
p<
.0
5;
**
*p
<
.0
1.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
de
vi
at
io
n
of
m
ac
ro
nu
tr
ie
nt
in
ta
ke
fr
om
th
e
ag
e-
an
d
ge
nd
er
-s
pe
ci
fic
D
R
Is
st
an
da
rd
s.
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
an
d
nu
m
be
r
of
ot
he
r
re
la
ti
ve
an
d
no
n-
re
la
ti
ve
s
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
In
di
vi
du
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
le
ve
ls
of
ed
uc
at
io
n.
L
og
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
is
de
fin
ed
as
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
co
m
e
af
te
r
ta
x
an
d
tr
an
sf
er
di
vi
de
d
by
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
.
C
on
st
an
t
is
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n.
N
eg
Sh
oc
k
is
de
fin
ed
as
1
if
th
e
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
fa
lls
m
or
e
th
an
25
%
fr
om
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
pr
ev
io
us
3
cy
cl
es
,
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
Page 26
T
ab
le
7:
E
st
im
at
es
of
pa
re
nt
s’
an
d
ch
ild
re
n’
s
in
ta
ke
s
w
it
h
fa
m
ily
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
,f
am
ili
es
w
it
h
ch
ild
re
n
of
se
x
m
ix
sa
m
pl
e.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
*G
ir
l
-0
.0
81
4*
*
-0
.1
13
**
*
-0
.0
96
3*
**
-0
.1
23
**
*
-0
.1
75
**
*
-0
.1
55
**
*
-0
.0
39
5
-0
.0
76
3*
*
-0
.0
68
4*
-0
.1
03
**
*
-0
.0
60
1*
-0
.0
44
8
(0
.0
32
6)
(0
.0
32
0)
(0
.0
31
7)
(0
.0
47
1)
(0
.0
44
9)
(0
.0
45
6)
(0
.0
36
6)
(0
.0
38
1)
(0
.0
38
8)
(0
.0
37
3)
(0
.0
36
1)
(0
.0
35
4)
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
*M
ot
he
r
0.
34
1*
**
-0
.1
40
**
*
-0
.1
34
**
*
0.
56
8*
**
-0
.1
86
**
*
-0
.1
84
**
*
0.
24
2*
**
-0
.1
84
**
*
-0
.1
73
**
*
-0
.2
24
**
*
0.
04
41
0.
05
44
(0
.0
35
5)
(0
.0
36
8)
(0
.0
37
1)
(0
.0
52
4)
(0
.0
53
7)
(0
.0
54
9)
(0
.0
35
5)
(0
.0
40
2)
(0
.0
41
1)
(0
.0
33
4)
(0
.0
34
2)
(0
.0
33
8)
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
*F
at
he
r
0.
63
3*
**
0.
10
7*
**
0.
09
76
**
1.
04
3*
**
0.
21
3*
**
0.
18
8*
**
0.
51
4*
**
0.
04
55
0.
05
50
-0
.2
82
**
*
0.
03
06
0.
03
07
(0
.0
40
1)
(0
.0
40
4)
(0
.0
41
8)
(0
.0
61
9)
(0
.0
60
7)
(0
.0
62
9)
(0
.0
43
3)
(0
.0
46
6)
(0
.0
48
5)
(0
.0
34
6)
(0
.0
35
1)
(0
.0
35
2)
N
eg
at
iv
eS
ho
ck
-0
.3
49
**
*
-0
.0
76
5*
*
-0
.1
75
**
*
-0
.5
19
**
*
-0
.0
91
2*
-0
.2
73
**
*
-0
.2
96
**
*
-0
.0
42
0
-0
.0
11
6
0.
07
37
*
-0
.0
89
3*
*
-0
.1
37
**
*
(0
.0
37
4)
(0
.0
38
8)
(0
.0
42
5)
(0
.0
49
1)
(0
.0
51
0)
(0
.0
56
5)
(0
.0
56
9)
(0
.0
58
7)
(0
.0
66
4)
(0
.0
40
8)
(0
.0
40
7)
(0
.0
42
5)
Lo
g
eq
in
co
m
e
-0
.0
92
8*
**
-0
.1
79
**
*
0.
03
62
-0
.0
42
0*
**
(0
.0
18
5)
(0
.0
24
3)
(0
.0
30
8)
(0
.0
13
8)
C
on
st
an
t
1.
31
2*
**
0.
59
0*
**
1.
48
4*
**
1.
75
4*
**
0.
60
3*
*
2.
31
1*
**
1.
23
0*
**
0.
65
4*
*
0.
33
0
0.
27
9*
*
0.
64
8*
**
1.
05
2*
**
(0
.1
66
)
(0
.1
93
)
(0
.2
61
)
(0
.2
14
)
(0
.2
67
)
(0
.3
57
)
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.3
18
)
(0
.4
08
)
(0
.1
28
)
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.1
76
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
20
,1
65
18
,7
86
18
,5
36
20
,1
65
18
,7
86
18
,5
36
20
,1
65
18
,7
86
18
,5
36
20
,1
65
18
,7
86
18
,5
36
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
03
0
0.
18
6
0.
19
3
0.
03
8
0.
22
8
0.
24
2
0.
01
0
0.
07
1
0.
07
1
0.
01
3
0.
09
7
0.
10
0
N
um
be
r
of
fix
ed
m
1,
38
0
1,
37
2
1,
36
4
1,
38
0
1,
37
2
1,
36
4
1,
38
0
1,
37
2
1,
36
4
1,
38
0
1,
37
2
1,
36
4
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
di
vi
du
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Fa
m
ily
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
So
ur
ce
:
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
C
hi
ld
re
n
2
to
17
ye
ar
ol
d.
Sa
m
pl
e
of
ch
ild
re
n
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
A
t
le
as
t
tw
o
ch
ild
re
n
in
on
e
fa
m
ily
ar
e
su
rv
ey
ed
in
on
e
cy
cl
e.
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fa
m
ili
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
.1
;
**
p<
.0
5;
**
*p
<
.0
1.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
de
vi
at
io
n
of
m
ac
ro
nu
tr
ie
nt
in
ta
ke
fr
om
th
e
ag
e-
an
d
ge
nd
er
-s
pe
ci
fic
D
R
Is
st
an
da
rd
s.
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
an
d
nu
m
be
r
of
ot
he
r
re
la
ti
ve
an
d
no
n-
re
la
ti
ve
s
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
In
di
vi
du
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
le
ve
ls
of
ed
uc
at
io
n.
L
og
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
is
de
fin
ed
as
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
co
m
e
af
te
r
ta
x
an
d
tr
an
sf
er
di
vi
de
d
by
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
.
C
on
st
an
t
is
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n.
N
eg
Sh
oc
k
is
de
fin
ed
as
1
if
th
e
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
fa
lls
m
or
e
th
an
25
%
fr
om
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
pr
ev
io
us
3
cy
cl
es
,
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
Page 27
T
ab
le
8:
Si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
es
ti
m
at
es
of
di
et
ar
y
in
ta
ke
on
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
in
co
m
e
fa
ll
(c
on
ti
nu
ou
s
m
ea
su
re
).
C
hi
ld
w
it
h
th
e
op
po
si
te
se
x
si
b-
lin
g
sa
m
pl
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
In
co
m
eF
al
l*
G
ir
l
-0
.0
79
7*
*
-0
.1
39
**
*
-0
.1
62
**
*
-0
.0
93
7*
-0
.2
32
**
*
-0
.2
68
**
*
-0
.0
43
6
-0
.0
27
9
-0
.0
51
3
-0
.2
32
**
*
-0
.1
37
**
-0
.1
23
**
(0
.0
39
6)
(0
.0
38
8)
(0
.0
40
0)
(0
.0
56
4)
(0
.0
51
6)
(0
.0
53
5)
(0
.0
42
2)
(0
.0
48
9)
(0
.0
51
1)
(0
.0
54
3)
(0
.0
53
3)
(0
.0
54
1)
In
co
m
eF
al
l
0.
12
0*
*
0.
08
65
0.
23
7*
**
0.
25
6*
**
0.
22
9*
**
0.
42
1*
**
0.
01
00
-0
.0
88
6
0.
17
7
-0
.1
24
*
-0
.0
40
2
-0
.2
55
**
*
(0
.0
56
1)
(0
.0
58
3)
(0
.0
77
4)
(0
.0
70
8)
(0
.0
71
5)
(0
.0
97
0)
(0
.0
78
9)
(0
.0
85
6)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.0
66
5)
(0
.0
66
2)
(0
.0
93
5)
Lo
g
eq
in
co
m
e
0.
07
62
**
*
0.
09
83
**
*
0.
13
1*
**
-0
.1
01
**
*
(0
.0
25
2)
(0
.0
30
7)
(0
.0
41
6)
(0
.0
31
2)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
5,
70
5
4,
98
2
4,
92
5
5,
70
5
4,
98
2
4,
92
5
5,
70
5
4,
98
2
4,
92
5
5,
70
5
4,
98
2
4,
92
5
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
8
0.
07
5
0.
08
0
0.
01
1
0.
13
7
0.
14
3
0.
00
8
0.
05
2
0.
05
9
0.
01
7
0.
14
0
0.
14
6
N
um
be
r
of
fix
ed
m
1,
20
7
1,
17
2
1,
16
6
1,
20
7
1,
17
2
1,
16
6
1,
20
7
1,
17
2
1,
16
6
1,
20
7
1,
17
2
1,
16
6
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
hi
ld
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
So
ur
ce
:
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
C
hi
ld
re
n
2
to
17
ye
ar
ol
d.
Sa
m
pl
e
of
ch
ild
re
n
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
A
t
le
as
t
tw
o
ch
ild
re
n
in
on
e
fa
m
ily
ar
e
su
rv
ey
ed
in
on
e
cy
cl
e.
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fa
m
ili
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
.1
;
**
p<
.0
5;
**
*p
<
.0
1.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
de
vi
at
io
n
of
m
ac
ro
nu
tr
ie
nt
in
ta
ke
fr
om
th
e
ag
e-
an
d
ge
nd
er
-s
pe
ci
fic
D
R
Is
st
an
da
rd
s.
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
an
d
nu
m
be
r
of
ot
he
r
re
la
ti
ve
an
d
no
n-
re
la
ti
ve
s
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
C
hi
ld
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
if
th
e
ch
ild
ha
s
gr
ad
ua
te
d
fr
om
pr
im
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
or
m
id
dl
e
sc
ho
ol
,
pu
be
rt
y
on
se
t
an
d
bi
rt
h
or
de
r.
L
og
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
is
de
fin
ed
as
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
co
m
e
af
te
r
ta
x
an
d
tr
an
sf
er
di
vi
de
d
by
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
.
C
on
st
an
t
is
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n.
T
he
%
In
co
m
eF
al
l
is
de
fin
ed
as
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
in
co
m
e
fa
ll
fr
om
pr
ev
io
us
cy
cl
e
us
in
g
C
P
I
ad
ju
st
ed
ho
us
eh
ol
d
eq
ui
va
le
nt
di
sp
os
ab
le
in
co
m
e.
Page 28
T
ab
le
9:
Si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
es
ti
m
at
es
of
di
et
ar
y
in
ta
ke
on
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
in
co
m
e
fa
ll
(c
on
ti
nu
ou
s
m
ea
su
re
).
A
do
le
sc
en
ts
w
it
h
th
e
op
po
si
te
se
x
si
bl
in
g
sa
m
pl
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
E
ne
rg
y
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
C
ar
b
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
Fa
t
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
P
ro
te
in
%
de
v
In
co
m
eF
al
l*
G
ir
l
-0
.2
79
**
*
-0
.3
25
**
*
-0
.3
34
**
*
-0
.3
84
**
*
-0
.5
12
**
*
-0
.5
33
**
*
-0
.1
93
**
-0
.2
20
**
-0
.2
39
**
-0
.2
08
**
*
-0
.0
70
5
-0
.0
51
0
(0
.0
71
0)
(0
.0
75
5)
(0
.0
79
0)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.0
85
9)
(0
.0
93
2)
(0
.0
97
9)
(0
.0
73
8)
(0
.0
75
8)
(0
.0
77
4)
In
co
m
eF
al
l
0.
07
69
0.
09
68
0.
38
6*
**
0.
26
3*
*
0.
29
1*
*
0.
72
7*
**
-0
.1
18
-0
.1
10
0.
13
1
-0
.0
73
6
-0
.0
66
7
-0
.0
47
1
(0
.0
93
4)
(0
.0
93
7)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.1
69
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.2
06
)
(0
.0
81
1)
(0
.0
77
1)
(0
.1
08
)
Lo
g
eq
in
co
m
e
0.
13
3*
**
0.
20
1*
**
0.
10
9
0.
01
30
(0
.0
46
3)
(0
.0
58
2)
(0
.0
72
0)
(0
.0
39
8)
C
on
st
an
t
1.
10
7*
*
1.
25
1*
**
0.
02
34
1.
27
5*
*
1.
45
4*
**
-0
.4
18
2.
08
8*
**
2.
18
9*
**
1.
16
8
-0
.1
60
-0
.0
89
7
-0
.1
72
(0
.4
43
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.5
91
)
(0
.4
99
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.7
39
)
(0
.6
47
)
(0
.6
25
)
(0
.8
21
)
(0
.3
35
)
(0
.3
40
)
(0
.5
27
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
22
3
2,
18
8
2,
17
0
2,
22
3
2,
18
8
2,
17
0
2,
22
3
2,
18
8
2,
17
0
2,
22
3
2,
18
8
2,
17
0
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
02
0
0.
03
1
0.
04
1
0.
02
8
0.
05
6
0.
07
0
0.
01
7
0.
02
2
0.
02
6
0.
02
6
0.
10
5
0.
10
2
N
um
be
r
of
fix
ed
m
96
2
95
1
94
6
96
2
95
1
94
6
96
2
95
1
94
6
96
2
95
1
94
6
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
hi
ld
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Si
bl
in
g
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fa
m
ili
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
.1
;*
*p
<
.0
5;
**
*p
<
.0
1.
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
C
hi
ld
re
n
2
to
17
ye
ar
ol
d.
Sa
m
pl
e
of
ad
ol
es
ce
nt
s
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
So
ur
ce
:
C
H
N
S
19
91
to
20
11
.
C
hi
ld
re
n
2
to
17
ye
ar
ol
d.
Sa
m
pl
e
of
ch
ild
re
n
w
it
h
si
bl
in
gs
of
op
po
si
te
se
x.
A
t
le
as
t
tw
o
ch
ild
re
n
in
on
e
fa
m
ily
ar
e
su
rv
ey
ed
in
on
e
cy
cl
e.
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
fa
m
ili
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
.1
;
**
p<
.0
5;
**
*p
<
.0
1.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
de
vi
at
io
n
of
m
ac
ro
nu
tr
ie
nt
in
ta
ke
fr
om
th
e
ag
e-
an
d
ge
nd
er
-s
pe
ci
fic
D
R
Is
st
an
da
rd
s.
H
H
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
an
d
nu
m
be
r
of
ot
he
r
re
la
ti
ve
an
d
no
n-
re
la
ti
ve
s
in
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
C
hi
ld
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e
if
th
e
ch
ild
ha
s
gr
ad
ua
te
d
fr
om
pr
im
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
or
m
id
dl
e
sc
ho
ol
,
pu
be
rt
y
on
se
t
an
d
bi
rt
h
or
de
r.
L
og
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
co
m
e
is
de
fin
ed
as
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
co
m
e
af
te
r
ta
x
an
d
tr
an
sf
er
di
vi
de
d
by
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
.
C
on
st
an
t
is
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n.
T
he
%
In
co
m
eF
al
l
is
de
fin
ed
as
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
in
co
m
e
fa
ll
fr
om
pr
ev
io
us
cy
cl
e
us
in
g
C
P
I
ad
ju
st
ed
ho
us
eh
ol
d
eq
ui
va
le
nt
di
sp
os
ab
le
in
co
m
e.
Page 29
Appendix II: Figures
Figure 1. Map of China with CHNS provinces
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (2017)
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Figure 2. Fertility Rate for Rural and Urban China (1973-2010)
Source: The figure is reproduced based on data from Zhang (2017). It is originally com-
piled from Peng & Guo (2000) for 1973-1992 data; the 2001 National Fertility and Re-
productive Health Survey for 1993-1999; Juan & Qiu (2011) for 2001-2009 data; and the
national population censuses for 2000 and 2010 data.
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